Indonesia joins Badr defense initiative as questions remain over foreign dependence

How the four-country framework will work

According to the Qatar News Agency, the signatories were Qatar's Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of State for Defense Affairs Sheikh Saoud bin Abdulrahman bin Hassan Al-Thani; Turkey's National Defense Minister Yasar Guler; Pakistan's Defense Minister Khawaja Muhammad Asif; and Indonesia's Deputy Minister of Defense for Logistics, Defense Industry and Technology Yusuf Jauhari.

Jauhari said Indonesia welcomed the initiative's respect for national sovereignty, priorities and laws. Kompas described Badr as Indonesia's first minilateral platform extending beyond its own region. Under its structure, an executive board will put forward projects involving the four countries for approval by a strategic board. An initial training and research project is expected soon.

The Qatar News Agency said Badr takes its name from the Arabic word for "full moon," reflecting the complementary roles of its members. Other friendly countries may join under criteria agreed to by the four founders.

Badr's industrial focus distinguishes it from the Mecca Joint Defence Agreement signed by Turkey, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia in August 2026. That agreement established a mutual-defense commitment, according to Al Jazeera. Turkey submitted it to parliament for ratification on October 21, 2026.

Technology transfer and existing production ties

Turkey's ambassador to Indonesia, Talip Kucukcan, said on October 29 that Badr's main medium- and long-term objective is to transfer technology to Indonesia, enabling the two countries to manufacture defense equipment together there. He also said Turkey had achieved 80 percent independence in its defense industry.

The partners bring different resources to that effort, defense analyst Arda Mevlutoglu told Al Jazeera. He identified Turkey's strengths as technology, systems integration and an established defense industry. Pakistan and Indonesia contribute production capacity, skilled workers and large domestic markets, while Qatar offers potential investment and demand. In his assessment, those capabilities allow the countries to develop integrated supply chains.

Existing bilateral programs provide a foundation for cooperation, according to the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD). A 2019 Turkish-Indonesian contract covered joint production of 18 KAPLAN MT tanks; Indonesia received the first batch in 2022.

Turkey and Pakistan also have a 2018 technology-transfer agreement covering four Babur-class corvettes for Pakistan's navy, with construction divided between Istanbul and Karachi Shipyard, two vessels at each location. Qatar, meanwhile, formed the BARQ joint venture with Turkish companies ASELSAN and SSTek in 2018, FDD said.

Indonesia's record of disrupted arms purchases

Writing in The Jakarta Post, Karachi-based columnist Imran Khalid places Indonesia's interest in Badr against its experience with restrictions on foreign weapons. His warning is that Jakarta could replace dependence on Western approvals with dependence on Russian and Turkish decisions rather than secure greater control over its defense capabilities.

The United States halted lethal arms sales to Indonesia after the violence in Timor-Leste in 1999. Once Washington lifted the restriction in November 2005, Jakarta put spare parts for its 10 aging F-16 fighters at the top of its list.

Another proposed acquisition stalled years later. Indonesia agreed in 2018 to exchange commodities for 11 Russian Su-35 fighters in a deal valued at about $1.1 billion. In December 2021, then-Air Force Chief Fadjar Prasetyo abandoned the purchase, citing budget constraints. The Jakarta Post's analysis described concern about CAATSA sanctions as an open secret. Indonesia was never sanctioned by Washington over the deal; as Khalid wrote, "The threat did the work."

Jakarta has since pursued equipment from several countries. The first three aircraft from its order for 42 Rafales arrived in Pekanbaru in January. It signed for 48 KAAN fighters in Istanbul in July 2025, is negotiating for 16 KF-21s from South Korea and has announced a purchase of Chinese J-10s. India supplies BrahMos missiles. Defense ties with Washington have continued as well: the two governments agreed to a Major Defense Cooperation Partnership in April.

Pakistan's experience with supplier control

Khalid uses Pakistan's fighter programs to illustrate the limits of changing suppliers. Islamabad paid $658 million for 28 F-16s but never operated them. Washington's invocation of the Pressler Amendment in 1990 blocked delivery, leaving both the aircraft and the payments already made to Lockheed and its suppliers in the United States.

The White House settled the outstanding $463.7 million claim in 1998 through cash and up to $140 million in goods. The goods included roughly $60 million worth of wheat.

Pakistan subsequently developed the JF-17 with China, but the aircraft still relies on Russia's RD-93 engine. Islamabad has purchased those engines directly from Moscow since 2014. "Russia sells the engine, not the know-how," Khalid wrote. His argument is that Pakistan shifted the source of a potential veto without eliminating it, and that Indonesia's pursuit of sovereignty will likewise depend on the terms it negotiates.

Projects and sanctions remain unresolved

In an October 23, 2026, policy brief, FDD said Badr's practical significance remained uncertain without accompanying projects, investment commitments or new arrangements for sharing production. The think tank questioned whether the memorandum would develop into a substantive partnership or remain primarily a declaration.

FDD also flagged the position of Turkey's Presidency of Defense Industries, known as SSB, which is expected to participate in Badr projects. The agency remains subject to US sanctions barring US export licenses and authorizations to it. FDD recommended that the US State and Commerce Departments clarify how those restrictions would apply to future cooperation under Badr.